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MUNICIEPAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: RIGHTS AND
REMEDIES UNDER AN INVALID CONTRACT
RICHARD B. LILLICH*

THE
New York common-law prohibition against conflicts of interest
on the part of municipal

officers and employees was evolved from
public policy to prevent self-dealing municipal servanti from profiting at
public expense. During the past half century, a complex of inconsistent
case law, patchwork statutory enactments and dogmatic administrative
opinions has converted this relatively precise principle into one of the
most confusing areas of New York law. Both lawyers and public servants
have experienced difficulty in handling two of the major problems in this
field of municipal law: (1) What. public servants are covered by the
existing rules? (2) What is the nature of the disqualifying interest?' A
third problem, by nature more diffuse and often more difficult, is presented
when a prohibited conflict of interest is found: What are the consequences
flowing from such an invalid transaction?
The problem is well illustrated by the case of the city airport commissioner who, in his capacity as a funeral director, has buried city welfare
recipients and has been partially paid for such services. This transaction
has been held to violate section 3 of the General City Law,2 the city
provision against conflicts of interest, and the court of appeals has deemed
such municipal contracts "not merely voidable, but void." 3 This does
* Member of the New York Bar. The author wishes to express his appreciation to
Milton Kaplan, Esq., Administrative Assistant to the Counsel to the Governor, for his
suggestions and criticism during the preparation of this article.
I. The above is discussed in Kaplan and Lillich, Municipal Conflicts of Interest: Inconsistencies and Patchwork Prohibitions, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 157 (1958).
2. N.Y. State Compt. Op. 57-744 (1957). The Comptroller of the State of New York
issues advisory opinions at the request of municipal officials whose transactions are subject
to post-audit by the Comptroller pursuant to N.Y. Gen. Munic. Law §§ 33-35. In addition,
he makes determinations of an official nature when he performs his pre-audit duty of disallowing state aid sought in reimbursement of payments made to local officials. The opinions
of the Comptroller are reported in the published annual Opinions of the Comptroller Relating
to Municipal Government (hereinafter cited as N.Y. Ops. State Compt.). Opinions of the
Comptroller not appearing in N.Y. Ops. State Compt. will be cited by their number and date.
3. Clarke v. Town of Russia, 283 N.Y. 272, 274, 28 N.E.2d 833, 835 (1940). Most conflicts of interest statutes in New York, with the exception of N.Y. County Law § 412(2),
N.Y. Second Class Cities Law § 19, N.Y. Canal Law § 110, and N.Y. Opt. County Gov't
Law §§ 314, 1020, do not expressly declare such contracts to be void, but administrative
opinion has correctly interpreted them in such fashion. 11 N.Y. Ops. State Compt. 127
(1955) and 7 N.Y. Ops. State Compt. 15, 20 (1951). Early legislation declared the prohibited
contracts voidable at the municipality's option. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1843, c. 57, p. 36. This type
of statute proved ineffective, since the discretion as to the exercise of the option was usually
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not mean, however, that no legal consequences are generated by the
prohibited dealings, since "void" is a word that has undergone substantial
legal surgery.' The airport commissioner may be compelled to bring
suit against the city in an attempt to obtain his remaining payments.
The city or its taxpayers, in turn, may seek to recover those payments
already made. Innumerable third parties, especially other funeral directors, may bring actions grounded on the illegal transaction. Finally, the
state itself may be concerned with the prohibited contract if the question
of state aid to the city welfare district based upon payments made in
violation of the General City Law should arise.
The rules that regulate the above ramifications of a city officer's contracting with his city will be discussed below. They will be shown to be
confusing, conflicting and far from consistent. That remedial legislation,
based upon the equitable principles behind the common-law prohibition
against conflicts of interest, is needed in New York will be shown to be
equally obvious.
I.

ACTION BY THE INTERESTED PUBLIC SERVANT

Little authority exists in New York on the question of whether an
interested public servant or his business organization may recover in
quantum meruit after the contract is declared illegal because of a conflict
of interest. In People ex rel. Schenectady Illuminating Co. v. Board of
Supervisors,5 where recovery in an action on a contract was denied
because the contract was invalid, the court stated by way of dictum: "Of
course, if a large sum of money were involved so that a rejection of the
bill would work great hardship and injury upon the relator, we might
adhere to the principle but make an exception of this case to work out
equity; but there is no occasion to do so here." 6 A recovery in such case
would necessarily have been on a quantum meruit theory since the court
had declared the contract itself void, excluding the possibility of a direct
placed in the hands of the very officials who had entered into the questioned contract.
Nevertheless, many city charters contain such provisions. Batavia City Charter § 14.8.
4. 5 Williston, Contracts § 1630 (rev. ed. 1937). See also 6 Corbin, Contracts § 1534
(1951): "It is far from correct to say that an illegal bargain is necessarily 'void,' or that the
law will grant no remedy and will always leave the parties to such a bargain where it finds
them. Such general statements are indeed found in great number, faithfully reprinted in
long columns of digest paragraphs; they render only a wearisome disservice when repeated
with no reference to the facts of the cases in which they have been made. Before granting
or refusing a remedy, the courts have always considered the degree by [sic] the offense, the
extent of public harm that may be involved, and the moral quality of the conduct of the
parties in the light of the prevailing mores and standards of the community."
5. 166 App. Div. 758, 151 N.Y. Supp. 1012 (3d Dep't 1915).
6. Id. at 761, 151 N.Y. Supp. at 1014.
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action on the contract. No subsequent New York decision can be found
squarely dealing with the allowance or denial of quantum meruit in such
situations.7 While some writers8 contend that Smith v. Albany 9 stands
for the proposition that quantum meruit will be denied in New York in
an action brought by the interested public servant against his municipality, an examination of the record on appeal indicates that the action
was grounded on contract and that the court of appeals in denying Smith
recovery was so doing because it considered the contract in question
invalid.' 0
Although many popular textwriters state that relief is denied the
interested party in the majority of states," it is more accurate to say that
there is an even split of authority on the point.' Thus, where the municipality has received articles or services of value, many cases hold that,
although the contract itself cannot be enforced, nevertheless a recovery
will be permitted on the basis of quantum meruit for the services or
Professor Antieau has
materials actually rendered or furnished.'
concluded:
"Many cases refuse [quasi-contractual relief], most on the ground that such a contract
was prohibited by statute and relief would circumvent the statute. On the other hand,
many well-reasoned cases permit quasi-contract relief, and it is suggested that this should
be the rule at least where no statute makes void the attempted contract. Removal of all
profits from the undertaking is14usually enough of a deterrent to one who would take
advantage of the municipality."'

While the above analysis of the problem is essentially sound, there is
no basis for the suggested distinction between situations where the contract is declared "void" by statute and where it is deemed invalid under
7. 7 N.Y. Ops. State Compt. 15, 26 (1951).
8. E.g., 1 Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law § 10.07 (1955).
9. 61 N.Y. 444 (1875).

10. Transcript of Record, pp. 19, 25-26, Smith v. Albany, 61 N.Y. 444 (1875).
11. Annot. 84 A.L.R. 936, 969-70 (1933), supplemented by Annot. 110 A.L.R. 153, 164
(1937), Annot. 154 A.L.R. 356, 375 (1945); 27 L.R.A. (n.s.) 1123-24 (1910); 63 CJ.S.,
Municipal Corporations §§ 975-88 (1950); Note, 16 Va. L. Rev. 628, 636 (1930). Cf. 6
Williston Contracts § 1786A '(rev. ed. 1938); Note, 20 Minn. L. Rev. 564 (1936).
12. 2 Dillon, Municipal Corporations § 773 (5th ed. 1911); Elliott, Municipal Corporations § 212 (3d ed. 1925); 10 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 29.113 (3d ed. 1950);
Woodward, The Law of Quasi Contracts § 260 (1913); Antieau, The Contractual and
Quasi-Contractual Responsibilities of Municipal Corporations, 2 St. Louis L. Rev. 230, 246
(1953); Note, 17 Minn. L. Rev. 101 (1932); 37 Am. Jur., Municipal Corporations § 274 (1941).
Cf. 6 Corbin, Contracts § 1534 (1951).
13. Abbott, Public Corporations § 156 (1908); 2 Dillon, Municipal Corporations § 773
(5th ed. 1911). Leading cases permitting quantum meruit are Spearman v. Texarkana, 58
Ark. 348, 24 S.W. 883 (1894); and Macon v. Huff, 60 Ga. 221 (1878). The last case cited
Smith v. Albany, 61 N.Y. 444 (1875). Cf. p. 32 supra.
14. 1 Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law § 10.07 (1955).
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1

the common law. 5 Why should a self-dealing fire district officer 16 be
allowed quantum meruit recovery and a similar city officer 1 7 be denied
such relief?' 8 In addition to this unjustified distinction, Professor Antieau
is incorrect in stating categorically that profits are removed when quasicontractual relief is granted, since such remedy permits the recovery of
reasonable value, which often includes profits. 9 To avoid the temptation
for public servants to avoid the rules, profits should be denied, but this is
20
done by allowing an actual cost rather than quantum meruit recovery.
The rationale behind allowing the interested public servant to recover
if he has innocently performed in good faith is further illustrated by an
early Kansas case, Concordia v. Hagaman:2 '
"When it [the contract] has been executed without objection, and actual benefits have
been received under it, all parties acting in entire good faith, the law is maintained and
the ends of justice subserved by . . . allowing compensation merely for the reasonable
value of the benefits received under it. Considerations of public policy do not require the
doing of less than this .

. .

. No rule which is applied for the prevention of wrong

should be used to work injustice to either of two parties who have both been equally
innocent of intentional illegality or wrong-doing. Principles based upon public policy
fail in their object when used as instruments of wrong." '22

The contrary view is represented by a California case of the same
vintage. "To say that implied contracts were not prohibited," wrote the
court in Berka v. Woodward,13 "would be to destroy the purpose and
efficiency of the laws, and leave the people at the mercy of careless or
unscrupulous officers.12 4 The decision is in harmony with those opinions,
15. Rhyne analyzes the cases in a similar fashion. "When a contract is void because ...
contrary to express prohibition of a charter or statute, no recovery thereon can be had
against the municipality . . . But if a contract is not within an express prohibition but is
merely voidable under common law or equitable principles, the contracting officer may sometimes receive payment for the reasonable value of benefits accepted by the city." Rhyne,
Municipal Law 261 (1957). While some cases make the distinction, they are relatively
sparse. See Tallman v. Lewis, 124 Ark. 6, 186 S.W. 296 (1916).
16. A contract of a fire district officer would be covered by the common law. 7 N.Y.
Ops. State Compt. 209 (1951).
17. A contract of a city officer would be covered by N.Y. Gen. City Law § 3.
18. Arkansas, which first allowed quantum meruit in all situations and then adopted the
common law-statute distinction, now makes a distinction between the type of statutory
prohibition. Quantum meruit is allowed if the statute merely prohibits the transaction, but it
is denied if the statute makes it "null and void."
19. Shaddock v. Schwartz, 246 N.Y. 288, 158 N.E. 872 (1927); Black, Law Dictionary
1408 (4th ed. 1951).
20. Town of Hartley v. Floete Lumber Co., 185 Iowa 861, 171 N.W. 183 (1919).
21. 1 Kan. App. 35, 41 Pac. 133 (1895).
22. Id. at 40, 41, 41 Pac. at 134.
23. 125 Cal. 119, 57 Pac. 777 (1899).
24. Id. at 128, 57 Pac. at 780.
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evidently based upon the assumption that the public servant must either
be granted the original contract price or denied relief entirely, that refuse
recovery on the theory that to permit it would be to deprive the municipality of the protection of a safeguard against the possible corruption of
its officials.2 5 Remove the assumption, however, and this theory would
seem of doubtful validity, for few public servants would be good enough
samaritans to contract with their municipality knowing that they would
have to stand the expense of litigation merely to recover their out-of-pocket
costs. Nevertheless, many courts adhere to the assumption in denying
relief, relying on the tired formula that recovery should be denied, "otherwise a means would be thereby furnished for the undoing of the law
itself." 26
As intimated, the state of New York law on the subject well bears out
one writer's observation that "the liability of municipal corporations in
quasi-contracts . . .has never been satisfactorily worked' out by our

courts."27 Several New York decisions, while not deciding this exact
point, apply similar principles to analogous situations, giving us some
insight into judicial thinking on the matter. Brady v. The Mayor," decided
a century ago, held that where a contract was void because made in violation of a charter provision requiring competitive bidding, no recovery
would be allowed either on the contract itself or upon quantum meruit.
Judge Denio, in denying quantum meruit, was affirming the general term,
which had written:
"It may sometimes seem a hardship upon a contractor that all compensation for work
done, etc., should be denied him; but it should be remembered that he, no less than the
officers of the corporation ... is bound to see to it that the charter is complied with.
If he should neglect this, or choose to take the hazard, he is a mere volunteer and suffers
only what he ought to have anticipated. If the statute forbids the contract which he has
made, he knows it, or ought to know, before he places his money or services at hazard. ' 29

This argument has far less validity in conflicts cases, where often there is
no statute to put the public servant on guard or, if such a statute exists,
it is so unreasonably broad that no one should be charged with knowledge
of its scope. While a contractor should expect bidding requirementS, a
city airport commissioner, in no way connected with the making or performance of welfare contracts, should not be deemed to know that he
25. Woodward, The Law of Quasi Contracts 261 (1913).

See Note, 26 Mich. L. Rev.

335, 336 (1928).
26. Norbeck and Nicholson Co. v. State, 32 S.D. 189, 198, 142 N.W. '847, 849 (1913).
See Note, 17 Minn. L. Rev. 101 (1932).
27. Tooke, Quasi-Contractual Liability of Municipal Corporations, 47 Harv. L. Rev.

1143 (1934).
28.

20 N.Y. 312 (1859).

29. 16 How. Pr. 432, 446 (N.Y. 1857).

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

is violating the city conflicts of interest statute, even though no actual
conflict exists, when he buries welfare recipients.
The rationale behind the Brady case was adopted by the court of
appeals in McDonald v. The Mayor,30 which has become the leading case
in New York for the proposition that quantum meruit recovery will be
denied in actions against municipal corporations grounded on invalid
contracts. The latter was an action for the value of gravel and stone sold
and delivered to New York City and used to repair its streets. Since
plaintiff offered no proof that the expenditure had been approved by the
common council or that the contract had been awarded properly to the
low bidder, the contract was declared invalid. Neither, stated the court,
could it support a claim for quantum meruit. "Where a person makes a
contract with the city of New York for supplies to it, without the requirements of the charter being observed, he may not recover the value thereof
'31
upon an implied liability.
The McDonald decision, in turn, was followed by the court of appeals
2
in its most recent pronouncement on the question. In Seif v. Long Beach,
the mayor, without authority, retained special counsel to perform legal
services for the city. These services were successfully performed, but when
the assignee of the counsel sought to collect the attorney's fee he was forced
to sue the city, its council having denied liability on the ground that the
employment was illegal. The court held for the city.
"Where the Legislature provides that valid contracts may be made only by specified

officers or boards and in specified manner, no implied contract to pay for benefits furnished by a person under an agreement which is invalid because it fails to comply with
statutory restrictions and inhibitions can create an obligation or liability of the city. In
[a] similar case this court has given emphatic warning that equitable powers of the
courts may not be invoked to sanction disregard of statutory safeguards and restrictions
[citing McDonald v. The Mayor]."
Recent New York lower court cases have been evenly split, some
allowing3 4 and some denying 5 quantum meruit relief. The latest holding,
Cassella v. Schenectady, 6 denied recovery to a city fire surgeon who had
30. 68 N.Y. 23 (1876).
31. Id. at 29.
32. 286 N.Y. 382, 36 N.E.2d 630 (1941).
33. Id. at 387-88, 36 N.E.2d at 632.
34. Ellis v. New York, 180 Misc. 968, 46 N.Y.S.2d 363 (Sup. Ct. 1943);
York, 175 Misc. 712, 25 N.Y.S.2d 27 (Sup. Ct. 1941), aff'd without opinion,
957, 27 N.Y.S.2d 425 (1st Dep't 1941).
35. Cassella v. Schenectady, 281 App. Div. 428, 120 N.Y.S.2d 436 (3d
Brown v. Mount Vernon Housing Authority, 279 App. Div. 794, 109 N.Y.S.2d
1952).
36. See note 35 supra.

Barry v. New
261 App. Div.
Dep't 1953);
392 (2d Dep't
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rendered medical services to his municipality without proper civil service
procedure being followed.
"The fact that the city accepted the benefit of the plaintiff's services does not entitle
him to recover in quasi contract. Recovery may be allowed against a municipality in
quasi contract for benefits received under an unenforceable contract where the invalidity
of the contract was due to a mere irregularity or a technical violation . . . but where the
making of the contract flouted a firm public policy or violated a fundamental statutory
restriction upon the powers
of the municipality or its officers, recovery in quasi contract
37
is uniformly denied."

Since the prohibition against conflicts of interest on the part of municipal
servants was embedded in the common law, and is now often found in the
form of statutory restrictions, this case offers little aid to the interested

public servant.
Some help may be obtained, however, from a court of appeals case not
8
in the field of municipal law, Rosasco Creameries, Inc. v. Cohen."
A
recovery was allowed in that case when the prohibited transaction was
found to be malum prohibitumand not malum in se. 29 Judge Finch made
this distinction:

"Illegal contracts are generally unenforceable. Where contracts which violate statutory
prohibitions are merely malum prohibitum, the general rule does not always apply. If
the statute does not provide expressly that its violation ill deprive the parties of their
right to sue on the contract, and denial of relief is wholly out of proportion to the requirements of public policy or appropriate individual punishment, the right to recover will
' 40
not be denied."

Since contracts prohibited by conflicts of interest rules are inherently
malum prohibitum, the above approach, if applied to such an invalid

transaction, would certainly grant at least an actual cost recovery to
the interested public servant.

In determining an equitable standard41 for deciding cases of this nature,
it is to be hoped that the New York courts avoid the ". . . danger of
jumping to a conclusion, either refusing all remedy in the belief that the
'illegal'

[contract] is bad and that no 'bad' man deserves relief, or

granting a remedy without sufficient regard for what the public interest
requires. 4 - In the effort to avoid such extremes, some strange middle
grounds have been taken. Minnesota, for instance, has held that the
37. 281 App. Div. at 432, 120 N.Y.S.2d at 440-41.
38. 276 N.Y. 274, 11 N.E.2d 908 (1937).
39. Cf. Tracy v. Talmage, 14 N.Y. 162, 179-80 (1856).
40. 276 N.Y. at 278, 11 N.E.2d at 909. (Emphasis added.)
41. Such an equitable standard is already found in § 20(5) of the N.Y. Gen. City Law,
which specifically authorizes cities "to pay or compromise claims equitably payable by the
city, though not constituting obligations legally binding on it." See Shaddock v. Schwartz,
246 N.Y. 288, 158 N.E. 872 (1927).
42. 6 Corbin, Contracts § 1534 (1951).
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interested public servant may recover in quantum meruit where he loaned
money or sold merchandise to his municipality, but not where he rendered
services to it.43 The reason for such a distinction is elusive. On the
other hand, one authority contended:
"If the contract is made directly with the trustee upon a matter in which he alone is
interested it would be against public policy to permit him to collect; but if he is an
official or stockholder of a corporation doing business with the city, the corporation should

not be precluded from recovering on the common counts because of this relationship.

'44

This distinction has some superficial plausibility, primarily because it
represents one of the tests used to determine whether a sufficient disqualifying interest is present to taint the contract in the first place. After the contract is found invalid, however, the distinction loses its validity, for the
rights rising from the prohibited transaction should be uniform rather
than dependent on either the subject matter of the contract or the type
of disqualifying interest which made it illegal.
Certainly it would seem that, viewing the complex New York conflicts
of interest rules which often promote innocent transgressions, quantum
meruit relief, or at least the allowance of an actual cost recovery as suggested above, should be permitted. Good faith, the condition precedent
for such a recovery, plus perhaps the removal of profits as an additional
safeguard, would combine to serve as an adequate watchdog of the
public interest. In addition, section 1868 of the Penal Law makes many
conflicts of interest situations misdemeanors, and no public servant would
risk criminal sanctions merely for the opportunity of a quasi-contractual
or actual profit recovery.
The latter approach was utilized by the Iowa Supreme Court in Town
of Hartley v. Floete Lumber Co.,4 5 where a stockholder, director and
manager of a corporation voted, in his capacity as city official, to contract
with the corporation. The contract was deemed bad, but since good faith
had been shown the corporation was allowed to recover the actual value
of property received and retained by the city. "The temptation to
violate this rule of public policy," noted the court, "lies in the profit
which may come to the individual from its violation. Remove all hope
of profit, and you remove at once the temptation."4 6 No fault can be
found with this solution. The New York courts, so inconsistent in analogous situations, would be well advised to give it their serious consideration.
43. Currie v. School District, 35 Minn. 163, 164-65, 27 N.W. 922, 923 (1886).
34 Minn. L. Rev. 46, 51 (1949).
44. Weiss, Law or Justice? 6 Fla. State Bar Assoc. J. 284, 286 (1932).
45.

185 Iowa 861, 171 N.W. 183 (1919).

46.

Id. at 865, 171 N.W. at 185.

See Note,
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Considerable authority can be found in other states for permitting
municipalities 48 and often taxpayers49 to restrain further payments and
recover past payments made to an interested public servant under a
contract deemed illegal because of a conflict of interests, in many
instances despite the public servant's having performed in whole or in
part.5o In New York, both municipalities and certain taxpayers51 have
the capacity to bring such actions, the only question being the extent of
the relief accorded. No New York case can be found in which a municipality brought such an action, but three supreme court cases have considered suits brought by taxpayers.
47. Since the scope of this article is limited to actions of a restitutionary nature, it does
not directly touch on the removal from office of municipal servants who have violated conflicts of interest provisions. N.Y. Pub. Officers Law § 36 provides that any town, village,
improvement district or fire district officer, except a justice of the peace, may be removed
from office by the Supreme Court for misconduct in office. City, county and school district
officers are not covered by the above section, nor are employees of the municipalities mentioned covered. Barber v. Lampman, 198 Misc. 135, 100 N.Y.S.2d 668 (Sup. Ct. 1950),
aff'd, 278 App. Div. 600, 101 N.Y.S.2d 924 (3d Dep't 1951). The main point of contention
under the statute concerns whether the removal is discretionary or mandatory with the court.
Three early decisions held it to be mandatory in conflicts cases, despite good faith on the
part of the public servant. Matter of Jackson, 231 App. Div. 838, 246 N.Y. Supp. 903 (2d
Dep't 1930); Matter of Moran, 145 App. Div. 642, 130 N.Y. Supp. 432 (2d Dep't 1911);
Matter of Smith, 48 App. Div. 634, 63 N.Y. Supp. 1018 (4th Dep't 1900). Three later decisions have held it to be discretionary. Wolfe v. Trask, 249 App. Div. 11, 290 N.Y. Supp.
970 (4th Dep't 1936); Village of Lake George v. Mayor, 242 App. Div. 723, 273 N.Y. Supp.
10 (3d Dep't 1934); Matter of Slack, 234 App. Div. 7, 254 N.Y. Supp. 669 (3d Dep't 1931).
The Comptroller has followed the lead of the more recent cases. See 9 N.Y. Ops. State
Compt. 380 (1953).
48. 6 Williston, Contracts § 1735 (rev. ed. 1937); 2 Dillon, Municipal Corporations
§ 773 (5th ed. 1911); 1 Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law § 10.07 (1955); 10 McQuillin,
Municipal Corporations § 29.132 (3d ed. 1950).
49. "[Tjaxpayers can recover if the officials of the municipality refuse to sue." 1 Antieau,
Municipal Corporation Law § 10.07 (1955); 18 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 52.18
(3d ed. 1950).
50. "When there is such a statute, it has been held that even though the bargain has been
carried out, the municipality may recover what it has paid." 6 Williston, Contracts § 1735
(rev. ed. 1938). Williston cites only one New York case for this proposition, Engel v.
Garner, 116 Misc. 289, 190 N.Y. Supp. 344 (Sup. Ct. 1921), discussed at pp. 41-42 infra. And
see Antieau, The Contractual and Quasi-Contractual Responsibilities of Municipal Corporations, 2 St. Louis L. Rev. 230, 244 (1953). Equitable considerations frequently mitigate this
harsh rule. "[E]quity courts have at times in suits by municipal corporations and taxpayers
ordered the city to do equity by returning benefits." 1 Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law
§ 10.07 (1955). See also 2 Dillon, Municipal Corporations § 773 (5th ed. 1911).
51. N.Y. Gen. Munic. Law § 51 permits taxpayers of any county, village, town or municipal corporation to bring such actions. N.Y. Gen. Munic. Law § 2 defines the term
"municipal corporation" to include a city. Thus, only school and fire district taxpayers have
no remedy. Schnepel v. Board of Education, 302 N.Y. 94, 80 N.E.2d 617 (1951); Blackburn
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Engel v. Garner 2 was the first of these cases. The taxpayers of the
Town of Ghent brought an action against a former town superintendent
of highways for the restitution of moneys received by him for furnishing
materials and supplying labor on orders of the supervisor, a contract
illegal both under the common law and section 1868 of the Penal Law.
The superintendent had acted in good faith, the town had been substantially benefited and the payments had been audited and approved by the
town board. Nevertheless, the superintendent was required to disgorge
all he had been paid. Perhaps to ease its judicial conscience, the court
added:
"I am not unmindful, in arriving at the conclusion in this case which I have arrived at,
that it is requiring the defendant to refund to the town moneys for labor and materials
which the town itself has received and enjoyed the benefit of; but this is one of that
class of cases which cannot be decided upon the individual circumstances and incidents,
but must be decided upon the general principles of law applicable to the official ' relation
3
of individuals to their employer, especially where the employer is a municipality.1'

The decision in the Engel case was so harsh that it was not followed
in either of the two subsequent decisions dealing with the question. In
the first of these, Sebring v. Staner, 4 a taxpayer of the City of Corning
sued for the restitution of money allegedly illegally paid to the city
superintendent of public works and to enjoin further payments. The
superintendent, it seems, had been guilty of receiving $10 weekly for
the hire of his car for official business. By stretching section 3 of the
General City Law to its broadest, the court held that it prevented the
public officer from contracting with the city for the use of the car.55
Nevertheless the court, noting that he had acted in complete good faith,
denied restitution.5 6
v. Clements, 297 N.Y. 971, 80 N.E.2d 358 (1948). Originally taxpayers had no remedy, the
courts holding that only the municipality concerned could bring an action. Roosevelt v.
Draper, 23 N.Y. 318 (1861); People v. Ingersoll, 58 N.Y. 1 (1874). This, of course, was a
hollow shell of a remedy, since in the usual case the municipality was being administered
by the very individuals who should have been sued for violation of the conflicts of interests
rules. Statutes were then passed giving the taxpayers a right of action. See N.Y. Sess. Laws
1875, c. 49, § 1; People v. Tweed, 63 N.Y. 202 (1875). Compare the latter case with People
v. Ingersoll, supra.
52. 116 Misc. 289, 190 N.Y. Supp. 344 (Sup. Ct. 1921).
53. Id. at 298, 190 N.Y. Supp. at 349.
54. 119 Misc. 651, 197 N.Y. Supp. 201 (Sup. Ct. 1922).
55. Such a transaction is now permitted by a statutory exception, N.Y. Gen. City Law
§ 20(33), another example of the many exceptions spawned by the broad blanket-coverage
prohibitions like § 3. See N.Y. State Compt. Op. 58-73 (1958).
56. The court also restrained future payments for the future use of the car. This holding
is to be distinguished, however, from the case where the public servant has fully performed
and has been only partially paid. In such a case, further payments will not be restrained.
See pp. 41-42 infra.

1958]

MUNICIPAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

"When an action for the restitution of public moneys is brought jointly against the officials who paid or authorized the payment and the official who received it, if there were
be enforced, even though there
no intentional wrongdoing or collusion, restitution cannot
57
were a technical illegality in making the payment."
5 the second decision subsequent to the
Ryszka v. Board of Education,

Engel case, sprang from an unusual fact situation. Board of Education
member Bromley was delegated the power to contract for repairs to a
school. The Buck Lumber Company agreed to do the job if labor was
supplied, so Bromley was employed to obtain and supervise the labor at
$1 an hour. After the work was completed and partially paid for, a taxpayer brought an action for the restitution of moneys paid under the
contract and restraint of further payments, claiming the employment of
the board member violated the rule that a public servant may not assume
a private duty in conflict with his obligations to the public. The court
stated that it would have dismissed any action brought by the interested
person for the contract price, but that since it was faced with a suit in
equity brought by a taxpayer, and the entire transaction had been in good
faith with a fine job done, the relief requested by the taxpayer should be
denied. Here we see both restitution and restraint of further payments
refused.50
Thus, two out of three lower court decisions deny taxpayers, and presumably the holdings would also apply to actions by municipalities, a
recovery in a suit for restitution of payments made under an invalid
contract. Any prognostication as to what position the court of appeals
would take if presented with the problem is edged with uncertainty, and
speculation on the question should be made in the light of William
Blake's purported observation that "to generalize is to be an idiot." Still,
in view of the weight of the lower court authority, it is not too much to
hope that the court, rather than summarily granting relief, would fully
consider the equities of the individual case and the facts surrounding the
making and performance of the particular contract before arriving at its
decision. 60
Such an approach offers no pat slide rule formula, but it is consistent
with the theory behind the conflicts of interest rules. These rules are
merely the application to public servants of a broad principle of equity
requiring all fiduciaries to act in scrupulous good faith and candor for the
57. 119 Misc. at 658, 197 N.Y. Supp. at 207.
58. 126 Misc. 622, 214 N.Y. Supp. 264 (Sup. Ct. 1926).
59. See Weiss, supra note 44, at 284, 286.
60. This may be wishful thinking in view of the rigid approach of the court in Clarke v.
Town of Russia, 283 N.Y. 272, 28 N.E.2d 833 (1940). See also discussion of Sef v.
Long Beach, and Rosasco Creameries v. Cohen, at pp. 36-38 supra.
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benefit of those whose affairs are in their care. 6' Applying this equitable
principle to the post-contract problem, Judge Dillon concluded:
"If the prohibited or void contract has been executed, the officer interested therein beand is bound to account for any profits which he
comes a trustee for the municipality
' 62
derived from the transaction."

Such a solution is the logical as well as equitable procedure. If the interested public servant is allowed an actual cost recovery, to be conversely consistent the municipality or taxpayers should be allowed to
recover to the extent of the actual profit received. In each instance both
parties would be made whole, with the public servant or his business
organization being penalized only to the extent of losing contemplated
profit. Granted good faith, the public policy behind the law will not be
circumvented by allowing the interested public servant to retain or receive only what he has expended from his own pocket.

III. ACTIONS BY THMID PARTIES
The rights of a variety of third parties may depend on the validity of
a municipal contract in which a public servant has an interest. The possibilities for actions brought by third parties stemming from invalid contracts are innumerable. Four situations have occurred in New York.
The first of these is presented when one of several interested parties
seeks to obtain a division of the resulting profits or otherwise enforce
what turns out to be an invalid contract. In such cases the courts gen3
erally refuse all relief and leave the parties where it finds them. " Thus,
4
in Woodworth v. Bennett, where a statute prohibited engineers on state
canals from becoming interested in any contract with the canal systems,
a partnership to bid for canal work of which a state engineer was a member was deemed illegal and one partner was denied recovery of his share
of the profits from a fellow partner.
The second situation, similar to the above, occurs when one of several
61. 1 Abbott, Municipal Corporations § 255 (1905) ; Lenhoff, The Constructive Trust as
a Remedy for Corruption in Public Office, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 214 (1954); Antieau, The
Municipality and Its Employees, 14 Det. L. Rev. 171, 173-74 (1951). Antieau states: "A
municipal officer or employee occupies a fiduciary relationship to the city. He is accordingly
accountable to the municipal corporation for every violation of good faith in dealings with
and for the city."
62. 2 Dillon, Municipal Corporations § 773 (5th ed. 1911). (Emphasis added.) Although
it is not clear from Rhyne's writings whether he would permit the municipality a complete
recovery or only a recoupment of profits, it appears that he, like Judge Dillon, leans toward
the latter. Rhyne, The Law of Municipal Contracts 34-35 (1952). An old Canadian case,
decided under the common law, takes a similar stand. See Toronto v. Bowes, 4 Grant 489,
aff'd, 6 Grant 1, aff'd, 11 Moore 463 (Can. 1854).
63. 2 Dillon, Municipal Corporations § 773 (5th ed. 1911).
64. 43 N.Y. 273 (1870).
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interested parties assigns his interest in the proceeds of an invalid contract to a third party, who subsequently sues the other interested parties
for the share. This was the situation in Bell v. Quin,65 where a city officer
and a contractor were interested in a contract for the supplying of coal
to New York City's almshouse in violation of the city charter. 6 The
contractor's note to the officer, made for a share of the resulting profits,
was indorsed to a third party. Since the note grew out of an invalid
transaction, the court. denied the third party recovery. 7
The third class of actions, and the most prevalent, are those brought
by disappointed contractors against municipal officials, alleging that the
award of a contract by the municipality to another contractor was invalid
because of a conflict of interest. In Matter of Clamp, 8 the second lowest
bidder sought a writ of mandamus directing that the bid of the low bidder, which had been accepted by the city, be rejected for the above
reason. In People ex rel. Crowe v. Peck, 9 the plaintiff, individually and
as partner in a disappointed publishing company, sought a writ of mandamus to compel the supervisors to cancel the designation of an official
newspaper, claiming that a supervisor was interested in the paper. And
in Yonkers Bus Inc. v. Maltbie,7 9 after the Suburban Bus Company had
obtained a certificate of convenience and necessity from the Public Service Commission to extend its bus lines, the Yonkers Bus Company
brought a proceeding to contest the award of such certificate, on the
ground that an alderman acting on the award was an officer of the Suburban Bus Company. Under the facts of all three of the above cases7 1
the plaintiffs were unsuccessful, but the decisions clearly indicate that, if
a prohibited conflict of interest had been present, a remedy would have
been available.
The fourth and final variety of cases are those where a third party
seeks to enforce a collateral right based upon a contract found to be invalid. In Clarke v. Town of Russia,7 2 the wife of a town laborer sought
workmen's compensation for her husband's death. To be entitled to such
an award she was required to show an employee-employer relation be65. 2 Sand. (4 N.Y. Super. Ct.) 146 (1848).
66.

N.Y. Sess. Laws 1830, c. 122, § 11.

67. This is similar to the rule in the law of negotiable instruments that the illegality of
a note making it void is a real defense which rides with the paper and can be set up even
against a holder in due course. See Sabine v. Paine, 223 N.Y. 401, 119 N.E. 849 (1918),
where a holder in due course was denied recovery on a note void at its inception for usury.

68.
69.
70.
1940).
71.
72.

33 Misc. 250, 68 N.Y. Supp. 345 (Sup. Ct. 1900).
88 Misc. 230, 151 N.Y. Supp. 835 (Sup. Ct. 1914).
23 N.Y.S.2d 87 (Sup. Ct. 1940), aff'd, 260 App. Div. 893, 23 N.Y.S.2d 91 (3d Dep't
The facts were assumed in the Yonkers Bus case, which was decided on motion.
283 N.Y. 272, 28 N.E.2d 833 (1940).
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tween her hubsand and the town at the time of his fatal injury. The town
contested the claim on the ground that the husband was also a justice of
the peace and member of the town board, that his employment contract
was hence void because of a conflict of interest, and that as a result no
employee-employer relation existed on which the widow could base her
claim for a compensation award. The court held for the town, denying
the widow her $4.16 weekly award.
From the above it can be seen that the problems presented by third
party actions are so diversified that it is no wonder they remain free of
statutory supervision. With the exception of actions brought by disappointed contractors to set aside tainted transactions, third party situations do not lend themselves to legislative codification. At common law
in New York, disappointed contractors have been given a remedy; California, by statute, has permitted not only contractors but also the entire
general public to set aside contracts invalid because of a conflict of interest. 3 This statute gives the public greater protection against the possible corruption of public servants by placing a right of action in more
hands and in the lawbooks for all to see. New York would do well to
adopt a similar provision.
Where an interested party or his assignee seeks a division of the proceeds from an invalid transaction, however, the question is more complex.
Equitable bias toward the innocent third party is mitigated by the realization that New York courts, in analogous situations, 74 have acted as
though there were little equity in the law. 5 Professor Corbin to the
contrary, 6 New York has been rigid in denying relief to third parties,
even when the relief sought is the enforcement of an entirely collateral
right.
Where a third party assignee sues a second interested party, a balancing-of-the-equities approach, with the scales tipped in favor of the innocent assignee, would be consistent with the standards advocated in Parts
I and II.17 There is even less reason for denying an innocent third party

relief when he seeks to enforce a collateral right. The conflicts of interest
rules are to prevent self-dealing, and it is hard to see how the likelihood
of self-dealing would have been increased had Mrs. Jay Clarke been
granted compensation. Where interested parties are suing each other,
Professor Corbin's test would serve well.
Such an approach, it must be emphasized, would not be in accord with
73. Cal. Gov't, Code Ann. § 1092 (West 1956).
74. See pp. 43-44 supra.
75. Cf. Stevens, A Plea for the Extension of Equitable Principles and Remedies, 41 Corn.
L.Q. 351 (1956).
76. See note 4 supra.
77. See pp. 32-42 supra.
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the substantial weight of New York case law. It is hoped, nevertheless,
that New York courts will adopt such a case-by-case standard when next
presented with the problem, since effective legislation in this area is not
envisaged.
IV.

STATE Am

While many parties are affected by illegal contracts, one party often
producing an effect is the State of New York." This stems from the
position of the State Comptroller, taken in 1943, of refusing to audit a
municipality's claim for state aid which is based on an expenditure made
by the municipality under a contract in which a public servant has a
disqualifying interest. 79 In the absence of a clearcut constitutional or
statutory provision expressly authorizing such action, ° it would seem
that the Comptroller would be on firmer ground to deny state aid only to
the extent of the profit made by the interested public servant. The current position, as shown by the introductory illustration of the airport
commissioner who buried welfare recipients, can often produce extreme
hardship.
Such a contract would be illegal under the broad blanket-coverage
provisions of section 3 of the General City Law.' If the city completely
paid the funeral director's bill, which it well might since no actual conflict
of interest is present and hence the parties might not realize that the
transaction was bad, it presumably would be unable to secure complete
restitution from the man."' Yet the state would deny all aid. Thus the
city would be unexpectedly forced to stand the entire cost of burying
the welfare recipients, which, in the last analysis, would mean that the
city taxpayers would be taxed again locally for the same services, with
the state in effect pocketing the initial levy. In many cities, and in other
smaller municipalities, this would represent a substantial burden on the
taxpayers, especially if the payments to the funeral director had gone
unnoticed for several years. This is a remarkable paradox, as the conflicts
of interest rules were designed with the thought of protecting these very
taxpayers.82
78.

One of the effects, not within the scope of -this article, is the penal prosecutions under

§ 1868 of the N.Y. Pen. Law.
79. 1 N.Y. Ops. State Compt. 340 (1945); 4 N.Y. Ops. State Compt. 471 (1948); N.Y.
Ops. Att'y Gen. 182, 183 (1943); N.Y. Ops. Att'y Gen. 144 (1944); N.Y. Ops. Att'y Gen.
168 (1944).
80. Cf. N.Y. Const. art. V, § 1; N.Y. State Fin. Law §§ 8(7), 54-a; N.Y. Soc. Welfare
Law § 160(3); N.Y. Educ. Law § 273 (10).
81. See pp. 40-42 supra. Even if the city were held to have a right to full restitution, a
statute of limitations might have run or the public servant might be judgment proof.
82. Of course, the same taxpayers are state taxpayers whom the Comptroller is required
to protect. This Peter-Paul argument is relatively weak, though, since the city taxpayers
would pay far more in additional local taxes than they would save from a theoretical reduction in their state taxes.
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If, however, the Comptroller would deny state aid only to the extent
of its proportionate share of the profit actually received by the funeral
director, the state and its taxpayers could not conceivably be paying for
local wrong-doing. The latter is the major argument advanced by those
who now support the total withholding of state aid, and it is negated if
the city is allowed reimbursement for only actual cost. The city, in turn,
would not be penalized since it would receive a substantial portion of
the state aid it was planning upon, and thus the purpose behind state aid
would be fulfilled. Since the city might well recover the profit made by
the airport commissioner, it could conceivably be made whole and its
taxpayers escape double local taxation.8" The funeral director would be
penalized to the extent of losing his anticipated profit, and the state would
be ahead to the extent of that portion of state aid, its proportionate share
of the funeral director's profit, which it would retain.
While it may be argued that until the courts adopt the theory urged in
Part 1I84 of limiting the municipality's recovery to profits the Comptroller
can not do otherwise than withhold the full amount of state aid, such an
argument is of the chicken-egg variety. Should the Comptroller adopt
the "actual profit" standard in withholding state aid, the New York
courts, which have been ambivalent on the point, would undoubtedly
utilize the same approach. At the same time, the necessarily painful
evolution of case law would be avoided.
V.

CONCLUSION

The ramifications of a municipal contract declared invalid as a result
of New York conflicts of interest rules are almost as hard to ascertain as
the rules themselves. Statutes are of no help; administrative opinion is
confined to the question of state aid; judicial precedent, although relatively plentiful, is either slightly off-point or of uneven depth. While the
courts may be moving in the right direction, both the certainty and the
symmetry of the law require legislative action.
Equitable principles have historically dominated the conflicts of interest field. As Judge Dillon noted,8 5 the municipal servant is a recipient
of the public trust, and if he violates that trust, whether intentionally or
unintentionally, he should not be allowed to profit at the municipality's
expense. Yet he should not be required to suffer severe hardship because
of what is all too often an innocent violation of the complex conflicts
rules. New York, like most other states,8 6 has made no attempt to pro83. Except, perhaps, to the extent the state withheld the part of the state aid representing
its portion of the profit and the city did not recover the profit.
84. See pp. 41-42 supra.
85. See p. 42 supra.
86. A few states have statutes covering part of the problems presented in this article.
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vide a statutory pattern to regulate the consequences of these violations,
which are inevitable in municipal life and especially prevalent under
New York's harsh and confusing rules. Hence a statute, which would
protect the public interest and yet not unduly penalize the interested
municipal servant, is urgently needed.
While such a statute would be novel in nature, it should not be hard
to formulate, since the groundwork exists at the present time. If the interested public servant has performed in good faith and not been paid, he
should be allowed an actual cost recovery. If he has been paid, his
municipality should be allowed to recover back to the extent of the actual
profit which he has made. The Comptroller, in cases of state aid, should
be required to reimburse the municipality to the extent of its proportionate share of the actual cost of the services or materials furnished the
municipality. Such a statute, it is believed, would amply protect the
public interest and yet eliminate the existing uncertainties and inequities
in this unsettled area of New York municipal law.
Pennsylvania and Colorado allow the municipality to recover only the profits made by the
interested public servants. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 3, c. 40, art. 19, § 5; Pa. Stat. Ann.
tit. 35, § 1548 (1949). Tennessee, however, allows the municipality to recover all it has paid
out and at 6% interest! Tenn. Code Ann. § 12-404 (195 ). Pennsylvania is not consistent,
refusing to allow the public servant even an actual cost recovery if he has performed and
not been paid. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 4683 (1949).

